How does monetary policy impact upon macroprudential regulation? This paper models monetary policy's transmission to bank risk taking, and its interaction with a regulator's optimization problem. The regulator uses its macroprudential tool, a leverage ratio, to maintain financial stability, while taking account of the impact on credit provision. A change in the monetary policy rate tilts the regulator's entire trade-off. We show that the regulator allows interest rate changes to partly "pass through" to bank soundness by not neutralizing the risk-taking channel of monetary policy. Thus, monetary policy affects financial stability, even in the presence of macroprudential regulation 
Introduction
The …nancial crisis has reignited the debate on whether monetary policy should target …nancial stability. Those who favor a policy of leaning against the buildup of …nancial imbalances (Borio and White, 2004; Rajan, 2006; Borio and Zhu, 2012; Disyatat, 2010; Schularick and Taylor, 2012; Stein, 2014) …nd their argument strengthened by a growing body of empirical research, which shows that the policy rate signi…cantly a¤ects bank risk taking.
1 But the opponents contend that this does not necessarily justify an altered mandate for the monetary authority:
why cannot the bank regulator alone take care of bank risk (Svensson, 2014) ?
Would a macroprudential authority indeed take care of the …nancial stability side e¤ects of monetary policy? This paper confronts two issues towards answering this question. First it models the e¤ects of monetary policy on banks'behavior and identi…es two channels, termed the pro…t and leverage channels. Second, it asks whether the regulator can neutralize these e¤ects. Modeling the trade-o¤ faced by a macroprudential regulator explicitly, we show that an optimizing regulator will not neutralize the impact that monetary policy has on …nancial stability. This, in itself, does not justify an altered mandate for monetary policy. But it does nuance the argument that macroprudential policy is a precision tool to address any externalities from monetary policy to the …nancial sector.
In our model a bank chooses both the riskiness of its asset pro…le, as well as how much to lever up its liability side. Risky bank portfolios and leveraged balance sheets often go together, as they did in the run-up to the global …nancial crisis. When banks have higher leverage, they have less at stake, because their own equity is then a smaller fraction of the total balance sheet. And risky assets make the possibility of externalizing losses to society through higher leverage more attractive, if bank debts are covered by explicit or implicit government guarantees. Hence, from the bank's perspective, asset side riskiness and liability side indebtedness are complementary.
In this setup we show that the monetary policy rate a¤ects the bank's risk decisions through two channels, pro…t and leverage, with countervailing e¤ects. On the one hand, a higher rate pushes up the bank's funding costs. This reduces its pro…tability and the bank then has less to lose from a risky strategy: when a deposit-insured bank has less own "skin-in-the-game"
it is more inclined to consider the upside of risk only. This is the pro…t channel of monetary transmission to bank risk. On the other hand, a higher policy rate makes leverage more expensive to the bank, which as a result would then opt for less debt funding. 2 This means that the bank internalizes more of its risk taking and reduces the riskiness on its asset side.
We call this the leverage channel of monetary transmission to bank risk.
The cumulative e¤ect of monetary policy on bank risk taking will depend on which of the two channels dominates. If it is the leverage channel that dominates, then the transmission con…rms the results of the empirical literature: lower policy rates translate into higher risk.
A macroprudential regulator is introduced in the model, whose tool is a cap on the leverage ratio, as has recently been implemented within the regulatory framework of Basel III. The regulator moves after monetary policy has been set (exogenously) and before the bank takes its decisions. His aim is …nancial stability and capping leverage retains more of the bank's capital bu¤er and also generates incentives for the bank to take less asset risk, thus reducing its probability of default. However, there are also costs associated with …nancial disintermediation as a result of limiting leverage, and the regulator takes these into account. His preferences are concave up, which means that sacri…cing additional credit supply against improved …nancial stability becomes more costly the more the regulator tightens his standards. We show that his trade-o¤ can be represented by a standard possibilities frontier and indi¤erence curve.
We show that the interest rate a¤ects the regulator's entire possibilities frontier. Both credit supply and bank soundness are a¤ected by monetary policy, and therefore the entire environment in which the regulator operates responds to monetary conditions. As we show using our model, it would take a knife-edge parameterization for the regulator to maintain the same level of …nancial stability in the face of any interest rate change. Normally the regulator would allow part of the transmission from monetary policy to bank risk to "pass through"
and would not use his tool to counteracts its e¤ects in full.
The direction in which monetary policy a¤ects macroprudential policy is not trivial, however. Under one set of conditions, which arguably relate to the upward phase of a …nancial cycle, the leverage e¤ect dominates. Then, an interest rate cut worsens …nancial stability. The regulator optimally tightens in response, but not to the point where …nancial stability returns to what it was before the rate cut.
Instead, under conditions that resemble a post-crisis environment the pro…t e¤ect dominates, and a rate cut improves …nancial stability. Here too, the regulator does not neutralize, but rather moves along with monetary policy by partly easing his policy (which in practice could take the form of post-crisis regulatory forbearance, for example). It is only under one very speci…c -knife-edge -condition that regulatory policy maintains …nancial stability at the same level for any interest rate, i.e., full 'neutralization'of the risk-taking channel of monetary policy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes related literature and how our contribution …ts in it. Section 3 presents the bank's problem and the assumptions that we make in order to derive analytical solutions. Section 4 then describes how monetary policy a¤ects the bank's behavior and thus identi…es two channels. Section 5 describes the regulator's problem and how monetary policy a¤ects his operating space and therefore utility.
Finally section 6 summarizes the results and discusses policy implications.
Related literature
The existing literature on the relation between monetary policy and the …nancial sector uses two types of models: DSGE macro models and bank-based models. In di¤erent ways both of these literatures have had much to say about the transmission of interest rates to the …nancial sector and about the implications for monetary policy. In some cases prudential tools are introduced and their merit as an alternative to leaning against the wind is considered.
In comparison, our paper contributes by explicitly modelling the optimization problem of a regulator and how this is a¤ected by monetary policy via a banking sector that has both endogenous asset risk and leverage.
In the DSGE macro literature many papers build on the framework of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) by incorporating …nancial frictions. Reviews of this literature can be found in Gertler and Kyotaki (2010) and Loisel (2014 Our focus is instead on providing an analytical argument for why leaning against …nancial imbalances could make sense.
In Angelini, Neri and Panetta (2014) the macroprudential authority has a single task, namely maintaining …nancial stability. In the absence of coordination, it tightens its regulatory standards too much in response to an adverse …nancial shock, imposing negative exter-3 Nonetheless, even absent bank risk choice there can be interaction between monetary policy and bank regulation: bank capitalization a¤ects loan rates, and thus interacts with monetary transmission. See, for instance, De Walque, Pierrard and Rouabah (2010) , Darracq Pariès, Kok Sørensen and Rodriguez-Palenzuela (2011), Kannan, Rabanal and Scott (2012) , and Agénor, Alper and Pereira da Silva (2013). Financial wealth can provide an alternative route to generate macro…nancial linkages (Vitek, 2017) . 4 Alternative approaches include non-linear modelling (Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014; Ajello et al., 2016) and general equilibrium models that are not dynamic and stochastic (Goodhart et al., 2013; Cesa-Bianchi and Rebucci, 2017) . 5 See also Bodenstein, Geurrieri and LaBriola (2016) , Van der Ghote (2017) and Carrillo et al. (2017) . (Valencia, 2014) ; the impact on information asymmetries (Loisel, Pommeret and Portier, 2012; Drees, Eckwert and Várdy, 2013; Dubecq, Mojon and Ragot, 2015) ; the incentives of bank loan o¢ cers or asset managers whose incentives deviate from pro…t maximization (Acharya and Naqvi, 2012; Morris and Shin, 2016) ; the impact on nominal contracts between banks and creditors that cannot be made state-contingent (Allen, Carletti and Gale, 2014); and moral hazard when policy rates are used as a bailout mechanism (Diamond and Rajan, 2012; Farhi and Tirole, 2012) .
Related to our paper is also Freixas, Martin and Skeie (2011) , who model the interaction between the monetary policy rate and optimal prudential regulation, although their focus is on liquidity regulation, whereas ours is on bank capital regulation (through a leverage ratio).
They show that the policy rate a¤ects both the pre-crisis incentives of banks to hold cash reserves and the risk of bank runs during a crisis. Moreover, liquidity regulation cannot perfectly substitute for the policy rate's impact, implying that conducting monetary and prudential policies separately is sub-optimal. Freixas, Martin and Skeie (2011) Miller world with irrelevant capital structure, is used elsewhere in the banking literature (Thakor, 1996) . In addition to d and c, we de…ne the following variables:
x : bank's chosen risk pro…le r : bank funding rate
gross rate of return on the bank's risky project p(x; d) : probability of bank survival (non-default), which depends on the bank's risk pro…le (x) and its leverage (d): The bank's expected pro…t is then as follows:
which is the probability of bank survival times the net return conditional on survival. Both 1. p (x; 0) = 1, since without debt there is nothing to default on.
2. p (0; d) = 1, since absent risk taking the bank always survives. That is, the x = 0 pro…le is de…ned to be the risk-free pro…le.
3. p (X; d) = 0 and p (x; D) = 0. We thus normalize maximum risk to certain default.
: the probability of default rises exponentially in the risk and leverage taken by the bank. Also a minimal amount of risk is very unlikely to lead to default but as risky behavior increases, the likelihood of default rises faster and therefore the probability of survival declines concavely.
rd. Increased risk taking lowers the probability of the bank's survival but, if the bank does survive then it earns a higher return. While the rate of return R rises in risk, the marginal gain from additional risk taking is declining. In other words, the bank has to push risk to increasingly large levels in order to generate ever higher returns. Note that the partial equilibrium nature of the model is implicit in the fact that the return on a risky project, R (x), does not depend on the state of the economy (including r).
A marginal amount of asset risk and leverage yields a higher expected return than no risk or debt (a su¢ cient but not necessary condition for this could be to impose that p 0 x ! 0 for x ! 0, and p
In conjunction with p (X; d) = 0 and p (x; D) = 0 (see point 3) this implies interior solutions. We restrict attention to interior solutions only as it is there that risk taking and leverage respond to monetary and prudential policies.
7. By implication, x 2 (0; X) and d 2 (0; D), where x and d are optimal asset risk pro…le and leverage respectively.
8. r = R (0), that is, r is the same as the risk-free (x = 0) rate of return. The bank's funding rate, r. The monetary policy rate -such as the Federal funds rate in the US or the repo rate in the euro area -a¤ects the cost of short-term wholesale bank funding directly. In the context of the model, we identify the policy rate with the risk-free rate r and will in the next section use it to perform comparative statics. The fact that banks pay no risk premium on their funding costs implies the that there is a deposit-insurance in place, assumed to be exogenous to the model (i.e. funded by the government not the bank itself).
Problem 1
The bank chooses a risk pro…le and level of debt to maximize its expected pro…ts, i.e.:
4 Monetary transmission That is, monetary policy might target in ‡ation and the output gap, which diverge from the leverage and credit cycle generated by the …nancial sector (Borio and Shim, 2007) . There are then policy rate "shocks" to the …nancial sector that originate in monetary policy's response to the business cycle.
Remark 2 The policy rate a¤ects bank risk taking incentives in two ways: directly through pro…ts, and indirectly through debt:
Then, Proposition 1 We identify these e¤ects as the two transmission channels:
Channel 1 -"Pro…t e¤ect", @x @r > 0: for given leverage, a higher r increases x Channel 2 -"Leverage e¤ect", @x @d @d @r < 0: a higher r lowers d , and consequently also x
Proof. The proof comes in two parts.
Part 1: Pro…t E¤ect
We …rst take the FOC of expected pro…ts in (2) w.r.t. x.
which, given that p 0 x < 0 can be more intuitively written as:
We can use (4) to infer the relation between r and x as it holds for all x, including x . The right-hand side (RHS) of (4) increases unambiguously in x, i.e.
@RHS @x
> 0. This is because: 
Solving for d we get:
It follows from (5) that 
A discussion of the risk-taking channel
Our result shows that a higher policy rate has two countervailing e¤ects on bank risk. On the one hand, it lowers bank pro…tability because the rate the bank has to pay on its funding increases with the risk free rate. With lower pro…tability the bank has less at stake and is more inclined to take risk. On the other hand, the increase in the policy rate raises the cost of debt and induces the bank to lever less. Leverage on the liability side and risk on the asset side are complementary, from the bank's perspective. With less leverage the bank sees fewer bene…ts to high risk projects, and thus lowers its optimal risk taking. If the "leverage e¤ect"
dominates the "pro…t e¤ect" then a rate hike lowers bank risk taking and vice versa, consistent with the results of the empirical literature discussed in the introduction.
As concerns the "pro…t e¤ect", note that we have considered a setup where there is no direct impact of the monetary policy rate on the bank's asset side. That is, the policy rate can in ‡uence the bank's choice of project (i.e., its risk pro…le), but the policy rate does not 7 Strictly speaking, we also need to invoke property 4 from the list in Section III. That is: p a¤ect the returns of the projects. In reality there is of course a transmission from monetary policy to a bank's assets as well as its liabilities. The transmission to bank assets is less direct, however, as asset returns are usually a¤ected by long rates, while the bank …nances itself against short rates. The monetary policy rate directly determines short …nancing rates while it has a much smaller impact on long rates (a statement that is valid mainly for conventional monetary policy, however, since quantitative easing does a¤ect long rates directly).
Regulation
A macroprudential regulator faces a trade-o¤. On the one hand, he cares about …nancial stability, but on the other he does not wish to constrain unnecessarily …nancial intermediation and credit provision to the economy. Irrespective of his formal mandate, no regulator would want to implement excessively stringent requirements in reality, for a number of reasons. First, limiting leverage imposes a direct constraint on credit provision to the economy. In the context of our model, the bank provides (d + c) worth of credit and thus the link between leverage and credit provision is linear. Admittedly, in reality there are several margins through which the impact on credit supply may be softened: banks may be able to issue some additional equity, or their borrowers may …nd alternative sources of funding, like bond or equity issuance.
Nevertheless, both of these tend to provide only limited potential relief, since particularly small and medium sized enterprises often have few alternatives to bank-based funding, while banks usually have to pay signi…cant discounts for additional equity issuance (Miller, 1995) .
Second, bank debt is special in many ways. This is clearest for the case of demandable deposits, which provide payment services as well as maturity transformation bene…ts to retail depositors. Wholesale depositors are similarly interested in the maturity transformation services of banks. Thus, regulators undoubtedly do see costs to restraining bank leverage, and this is why they never actually opt for demanding primarily equity …nanced banks.
The regulator' s problem
In the context of our model the …nancial stability objective is captured by p (x; d), the probability of bank survival. The regulator maximizes the following utility function: 
where the …rst term is negative (since @p(x;d) @d < 0) and the second is positive. Bank leverage has countervailing e¤ects on the regulator's aims because leverage raises bank risk but also increases bank credit provision.
We provide the regulator with a simple tool, a leverage cap d, with which it can control the bank's debt pro…le. This tool is akin to the leverage ratio in Basel III, and had been part of Basel I in the past. It was temporarily discarded during the Basel II era, but the degree of leverage buildup by …nancial intermediaries before the recent …nancial crisis convinced regulators to re-introduce the tool. This is the simplest tool to apply within our framework, and allows for clear-cut analytical results.
It is in the nature of a leverage ratio that its e¤ects are broad-based, since credit supply is directly linked to the size of bank balance sheets, which in turn depend upon the price and availability of ample bank funding. We note that if instead the regulator would have access to some tool, which could directly target bank risk taking, x, without any other side e¤ects, then the problem we investigate would not arise. There would be no trade-o¤ to the regulator and he would simply maintain minimum risk according to his tool. We would argue, however, that most realistic macroprudential tools do have macroeconomic implications.
Similar to a leverage ratio, for instance, systemic capital surcharges a¤ect bank funding costs, and may therefore impact credit supply. LTV ratios are another common macroprudential tool, which can improve the resilience of the property sector to adverse shocks, but also have macroeconomic consequences: households may need to consume less and save more in order to a¤ord the larger down payments on a house. Thus, while we consider one speci…c type of macroprudential tool, we believe that the type of trade-o¤ we allude to is more generally applicable.
Problem 3 Given bank maximization of expected pro…ts in (2), the regulator'chooses a leverage cap, d, to maximize utility, i.e.:
That is, the regulator acts …rst, determining the leverage cap, after which the bank solves its optimization problem. Through backward induction the regulator knows how his tool will a¤ect the bank's choice variables: namely, the extent to which d will constrain the bank's preferred d , and how this will a¤ect x and in turn the e¤ect on p (x; d).
The regulator faces concave up indi¤erence curves and concave down possibilities frontiers
Concave up indi¤erence curves: This is the result of standard concavity assumptions:
i.e. 00 p( ) < 0 and 00 d < 0. Intuitively, this means that the marginal bene…t of additional bank soundness is positive but declining (improving …nancial stability is more important when default risk is high than when it is low) and similarly the bene…t of additional credit provision is positive but declining (more credit is particularly valuable when …rms and households are credit constrained, but less so when there is already ample credit going around).
Concave down possibilities frontiers:
Here the convexity of the possibilities frontier comes from previous assumptions: we recall that p 
Next we turn to the impact of an interest rate change, which as far as the regulator is conserned is exogenous. We can think of an exogenous monetary authority moving …rst, setting its interest rate according to its own objectives. Subsequently, the macroprudential regulator comes in and decides how to best respond given the interest rate environment. And …nally the bank determines its asset risk pro…le and leverage given the interest rate and macroprudential policy. Note that here we are giving the regulator the maximum extent of " ‡exibility" to cope with bank risk taking. In reality, the macroprudential policy is infrequently adjusted in most countries, contrary to monetary policy which can move at a higher frequency. This would mean that the macroprudential regulator has less ability to counteract the impact of monetary policy on …nancial stability.
Interest rate impact on bank risk taking
Our focus is on how the regulator's operating space is a¤ected by interest rate changes and how he responds as a result. Any interest rate change is going to a¤ect the possibilities frontier and therefore the regulator's ability to achieve …rst best. To demonstrate that we derive …rst the slope of the possibilities frontier:
. In derived form this is:
We can then examine how this slope changes with r and therefore also monetary policy:
where term 
For any inward pivot of the possibilities frontier, and with concave up indi¤erence curves, it must be true that the new optimum moves "inward" too. That is to say, the rate cut causes a decrease of both the regulator's leverage cap d and a decline in the bank's survival probability, p (x; d). In other words, a rate cut puts upward pressure on bank risk, and the regulator counteracts this by tightening macroprudential policy. However, given the trade-o¤s he faces, he does not go so far as to keep …nancial stability the same. That is, he allows part of the e¤ect of monetary policy on bank risk to "pass through" to …nancial stability, and bank soundness is unambiguously lower after the rate cut than before it, in spite of the regulator's tightening. The entire trade-o¤ of a macroprudential regulator is a¤ected by the policy rate, and since he is unwilling to truly "neutralize" its impact, monetary policy imposes a negative externality. The situation depicted in …gure 2 depends on the relative strength of the leverage e¤ect. As suggested by most of the cited empirical studies (see footnotes 1 and 2), this e¤ect may have dominated in the run-up to the global …nancial crisis. If so, a low interest rate environment worsens the trade-o¤ the regulator faces. before. This is represented in …gure 3.
Figure 3: impact of a rate cut when the pro…t e¤ect is relatively strong
Intuitively, we could relate this to a post-crisis situation, where banks have to deleverage because, among other reasons, they face funding constraints. Given the need to deleverage, a rate cut does not spur levering incentives but does maintain banks' pro…tability. Absent that pro…tability, banks'incentives to gamble might rise, as arguably occurred in the wake of the US Savings & Loan crisis or the Japanese crisis of the early 1990s (Peek and Rosengren, 2005) . In this type of situation a rate cut improves …nancial stability (at least temporarily) and the regulator allows this to "pass through" by partly loosening his standards. A realistic example would be regulatory forbearance on the rebuilding of capital bu¤ers after a crisis, allowing banks a long period of time to acquire the needed equity.
Case 3: Knife-edge: there exists one speci…c case where regulation does not respond at all to monetary policy. This occurs for a very speci…c parameterization and …gure 1 then represents the regulator's problem for any r. From equation (7) 
A rate cut dr < 0 will then lead to a regulatory tightening d d < 0, but not to the point that the same level of …nancial stability is maintained: dp < 0.
When instead @x @r
is large enough compared to @d @r , then
Here, a rate cut will lead to a regulatory loosening i.e.: d d > 0, which nonetheless maintains more …nancial stability than initially, i.e.: dp > 0.
3. In between, there exists a knife-edge case where Overall, then, the regulator does not counterbalance the risk-taking channel of monetary policy. This occurs in spite of the fact that the regulator decides on policy before the bank, has full knowledge of the bank's problem and has complete freedom to adjust his policy. The reason is that monetary policy a¤ects the whole optimization problem of the regulator, not just bank risk. The regulator's optimal policy thus does not keep the probability of bank default constant. The analysis shows that monetary policy continues to a¤ect bank risk taking. In an environment where both monetary and regulatory authorities are setting policy optimally but independently of each other, an interest rate change constitures an externality that the regulator will not neutralize.
Policy implications
The recent empirical literature has found con…rming evidence that monetary policy a¤ects …nancial stability. In this paper we set up a model in which we demonstrate that there are two channels through which a change in the interest rate a¤ects a bank's behavior: through pro…t and leverage. The question that then follows is whether the regulator is in the position to neutralize these e¤ects and still achieve his objective of safeguarding …nancial stability. We show that monetary policy a¤ects the environment in which the regulator operates, (possibilities frontier) and that by itself implies that even in an optimizing framework, the regulator will not neutralize these two e¤ects.
The direction in which monetary policy pushes macroprudential regulation depends on the state of the …nancial cycle. In buoyant times when …nancial intermediaries are inclined to take on more leverage and their pro…tability is secured, a rate cut is likely to spur on more risk taking. Following our model, this will only be partly counteracted by a regulatory tightening and the macroprudential authority would be allowing part of the negative impact of monetary policy to …nancial stability to "pass through". Instead, at times when banks are less inclined to lever and their pro…tability is impaired, such as in the aftermath of a …nancial crisis, a rate cut may actually translate into reduced risk taking incentives. The regulator will optimally move in the same direction as the monetary authority, and loosen regulation when monetary policy becomes more accommodative.
The question that follows this analysis, but which the paper does not address explicitly, is 19 what the knowledge of these two transmission e¤ects imply for monetary policy itself. Should monetary policy internalize the regulator's problem and therefore, 'lean against …nancial imbalances'on the upside but 'lean with the wind'on the downturn of the …nancial cycle? Or does the issue merit full coordination of monetary and macroprudential policies? 8 The paper stops short of providing an answer to this, but the recent trend of central banks acquiring macroprudential portfolios is a re ‡ection of its potential merits.
